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Abstract
Emerging countries tend to default when their economic conditions worsen. If harsh
economic conditions in an emerging country correspond to similar conditions for the U.S.
investor, then foreign sovereign bonds are particularly risky. We explore how this mechanism
impacts the data and influences a model of optimal borrowing and default. Empirically, the
higher the correlation between past foreign bond and U.S. market returns, the higher the
average sovereign excess returns. The market price of sovereign risk appears in line with its
corporate counterpart. In the model, sovereign defaults and bond prices depend not only on
the borrowers’ economic conditions, but also on the lenders’ time-varying risk aversion.
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I. Introduction
Most empirical and theoretical studies of sovereign yields assume that investors are risk-neutral
and thus that expected returns on sovereign bonds should equal the risk-free rate. If investors
are risk-neutral, sovereign bond prices depend on expected default probabilities, recovery rates,
as well as risk-free rates. This simple reasoning is commonly applied to the six trillion U.S. dollar
public sector debt in emerging countries. Yet, its premises are flatly rejected by sovereign bond
prices: in this paper, we demonstrate the impact of risk aversion.
The importance of risk aversion is intuitive. There is a tendency for emerging countries to
default when they experience adverse economic conditions. If these adverse economic conditions
correspond to an economic downturn in the U.S., then countries tend to default when risk-
averse U.S. investors experience harsh economic conditions. In this scenario, sovereign bonds
are particularly risky, and U.S. investors expect compensation for that risk through a high return.
Alternatively, if poor economic conditions in a foreign country correspond to thriving times for
U.S. investors, then sovereign bonds are less risky and may even hedge U.S. aggregate risk. As a
result, sovereign bond prices must also depend on the timing of the bond payoffs. The intuition
starts off the correlation between macroeconomic conditions in emerging countries and in the
U.S., but most emerging countries lack high frequency macroeconomic data. To address this
issue, we thus turn to financial series.
We build portfolios of sovereign bond indices by sorting countries along two dimensions:
their covariance with U.S. economic conditions and their default probabilities. For the first sort,
we compute bond betas, which are defined as the slope coefficients in regressions of past one-
month sovereign bond excess returns on one-month U.S. equity excess returns at daily frequency.
For the second sort, we use Standard and Poor’s credit ratings. After sorting countries along
these two dimensions, we obtain six portfolios and a large cross-section of holding period excess
returns. Our sample focuses on the benchmark JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Indices
(EMBI) and thus starts in December 1993 and ends in May 2011. If investors were risk-neutral,
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all average excess returns should be zero. However, in the data we examine, we find just the
opposite, with returns ranging from 4% to 15%. The spread in average excess returns between
low and high default probability countries is about 5 percent per year. The spread in average
excess returns between low and high bond beta countries is more than 5 percent per year. The
results are robust to different sorting variables, different weighting schemes, and different credit
ratings. Although the sample encompasses several defaults and some turbulent economic times,
large excess returns could theoretically correspond to “Peso” events, i.e. series of defaults
waiting to happen. We address this possibility in two steps: first, we conduct a thorough asset
pricing experiment, and second, we build a model that rules out a “Peso” explanation of our
empirical findings.
We find that average sovereign bond excess returns compensate investors for taking on
aggregate risk and that the price of sovereign risk is fully consistent with the price of corporate
risk. Average EMBI excess returns correspond to the covariances between returns and one
risk factor, either the U.S. stock market or the U.S. corporate bond market. The higher the
covariances between sovereign returns and U.S. equity (or U.S. BBB corporate bond) returns,
the higher the average sovereign returns. Market prices of risk are positive and significant,
and pricing errors are not statistically different from zero. The market price of bond risk is not
statistically different from the mean of the U.S. BBB corporate bond excess return, as implied by
a simple no-arbitrage condition. Moreover, as in other asset markets, the price of risk increases
in bad times, as measured by a high value of the equity option-implied volatility (VIX) index. We
obtain consistent results in panel regressions of country-level EMBI returns, i.e., without forming
any portfolio at all, as well as with world equity and bond market risk factors, thus extending
our results beyond U.S. investors. All our findings point towards a risk-based explanation of
sovereign bond returns and thus a new determinant of sovereign bond prices.
To uncover the implications of our findings in terms of optimal borrowing and default and
confront “Peso” explanations of excess returns, we build on the seminal work of Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) and provide a numerical illustration of a model with endogenous default and
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time-varying risk premia. In the model, a small open economy borrows from a large developed
country (the U.S., for example). We assume that investors are risk averse and have external
habit preferences, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The rest of the model builds on Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). Every period, foreign countries decide to either
default and face exclusion from financial markets, or repay their debt and consider borrowing
again.
The key novelty of our model appears in the link between lenders’ risk premia and borrowers’
optimal default decisions. In the model, defaults depend partly on lenders’ risk aversion. To
illustrate this point, let us assume that business cycles are positively correlated. In this case,
sovereign bonds are risky. When lenders experience a series of bad consumption growth shocks,
their consumption becomes closer to their subsistence level and their risk aversion increases. If
lenders are very risk averse, both risk premia and interest rates are high. Since it is very costly
to borrow, emerging countries tend to default when they experience adverse conditions. As a
result, when shocks across countries are positively correlated, defaults in emerging countries
are more likely when lenders’ risk aversion is high. In times of extreme risk-aversion, it looks
as if lenders are pushing borrowers to default. As lenders’ risk aversion influences borrowers’
default decisions, it also naturally impacts optimal debt quantities and prices. Risk aversion
thus implies that borrowing and default decisions depend on both the borrowers’ and lenders’
economic conditions. Sovereign risk premia deliver a novel link across countries: opening up
capital markets exposes emerging countries to U.S. business cycle risk.
In order to analyze the model’s results and compare them with actual data, we replicate
on simulated series our portfolio and benchmark asset pricing experiment. Several independent
simulations are run with different emerging economies. The only source of heterogeneity across
small open economies is their correlation with the U.S. business cycle. Portfolios of simulated
sovereign bonds are built by ranking countries on their U.S. stock market betas, as in the data.
The model delivers a cross-section of average excess returns. Countries that are risky from
the lenders’ perspective offer higher returns. But bond issuances and defaults are endogenous
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choices: countries facing high borrowing costs choose to borrow less, thereby lowering their
default probabilities. In the simulations (as in the data), high beta countries pay higher interest
rates even if they do not borrow more in equilibrium. The model also sheds light on “Peso”
explanations of sovereign bond returns. A version of the model with risk-neutral investors
delivers sizable excess returns in small samples with lower default probabilities than in the long
run, but it cannot reproduce the cross-section of excess returns obtained by ranking countries
on stock market betas. The model thus reinforces our empirical results, pointing to risk as a
key determinant of sovereign bond prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III describes the
data, our empirical methodology, and our portfolios of sovereign bonds. Section IV shows that
one risk factor explains most of the cross-sectional variation in average excess returns across
our portfolios. In Section V, we describe a model with endogenous default and time-varying risk
premia. Section VI presents a simulation of the model that qualitatively replicates our empirical
findings. Section VII concludes. Our portfolios of sovereign bond excess returns are available
on our websites. A separate appendix, also available online, reports the additional robustness
checks mentioned in the paper, along with details on the calibration and simulation of the model.
II. Related Literature
This paper is related to two strands of literature on sovereign debt. First, this paper contributes
to a large body of empirical work on emerging market bond spreads.1 We do not attempt to
survey this literature but focus instead on the two papers that are most related to ours, i.e. Pan
and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011). In these seminal
1Uribe and Yue (2006) point out that U.S. interest rates play an important role in driving sovereign risk and
the business cycle of emerging markets. Other papers on the empirical determinants of sovereign spreads include
Edwards (1984), Boehmer and Megginson (1990), Adler and Qi (2003), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007),
Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu (2008) , Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2010), Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010),
Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010), Andrade and Chhaochharia (2011), Ang and Longstaff (2011), and Acharya,
Drechsler and Schnabl (2011). See Almeida and Philippon (2007) for related evidence on corporate bond spreads
and its implications on corporate capital structure, and see Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) for related evidence
in structured finance.
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papers, the authors report that global factors explain a large fraction of the changes in emerging
market credit default swap (CDS) spreads. We extend their work to a larger and longer sample
of sovereign bond returns and, most importantly, show that the market price of sovereign risk is
in line with the market price of corporate risk, leaving no arbitrage opportunities on average bond
excess returns. This key result is obtained in a very general setting. Our estimation does not
rely on an affine sovereign credit valuation model, a constant recovery rate, or an exogenously
specified law of motion for the default probability, but simply tests the Euler equation of a U.S.
investor on a novel cross-section of sovereign bond returns.
Second, our paper builds on the theoretical literature on optimal sovereign lending with
defaults.2 Here, the papers closest to ours are Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).
In these papers, as in most of the literature, investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. A limited
number of papers, however, consider risk aversion. We rapidly list them here, starting from
the reduced-form approaches. Andrade (2009) specifies an exogenous pricing kernel. Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) do not specify investor preferences but propose a three-period
model to determine the optimal term structure of sovereign debt when returns are negatively
correlated to pricing kernels. In her seminal paper, Arellano (2008) mostly focuses on risk-neutral
investors, but also considers a reduced form of the lenders’ stochastic discount factor that is
similar to constant relative risk-aversion. Lizarazo (2010) investigates decreasing absolute risk
aversion in the same model. The large cross-section of average excess returns that we report
in the next section is, however, not consistent with such preferences. By introducing habit
preferences, we obtain large and time-varying risk premia that are consistent with the data and
illustrate the role of risk-aversion in cross-country linkages.
This paper thus also builds on the macro-finance literature. When investors are risk-neutral,
there is no role for covariances in sovereign bond prices, and expected excess returns are zero.
2Recent papers in this segment of the literature include Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Atkeson (1991), Kehoe and
Levine (1993), Zame (1993), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton
(2003), Bolton and Jeanne (2007), Amador (2008), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2009), Benjamin and Wright (2009), Pouzo (2009), Chien and Lustig (2010), Yue (2010), and Broner, Martin
and Ventura (2010).
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With constant risk-aversion, the large spread in returns due to covariances would imply a very
large risk aversion coefficient and an implausible risk-free rate, as Mehra and Prescott (1985)
and Weil (1989) find on equity markets. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) preferences offer a
solution to the equity premium puzzle, endogenously delivering a volatile stochastic discount
factor that implies high Sharpe ratios. Moreover, these preferences entail time-varying risk
aversion, and thus a time-variation in the market price of risk, as we find in the data.3 Our
paper thus combines the international macroeconomics and finance literatures in order to shed
new light on sovereign debt.
III. The Cross-Section of EMBI Returns
We take the perspective of a U.S. investor who borrows in U.S. dollars to invest in sovereign
bonds issued in U.S. dollars by emerging countries. We describe the data and methodology, and
then report the main characteristics of our cross-section of sovereign excess returns.
III. A. Data and Notation
Data on Emerging Markets JP Morgan publishes country-specific indices that market partic-
ipants consider as benchmarks. The JP Morgan EMBI indices cover low or middle income per
capita countries, and thus our main dataset contains 41 countries: Argentina, Belize, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, South Ko-
rea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam.
3There are at least two other classes of dynamic asset pricing models that account for several asset pricing
puzzles: the long-run risk framework of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and the disaster risk framework of Rietz (1988)
and Barro (2006). These two classes of models deliver volatile stochastic discount factors and high risk premia.
They are legitimate candidates to describe the representative investor in models of sovereign lending.
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The JP Morgan EMBI Global total return index includes accrued dividends and cash pay-
ments. In each country, the index is a market capitalization-weighted aggregate of U.S. dollar-
denominated Brady Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and local market debt instruments issued
by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities and mostly uncollateralized. These bonds are liquid
debt instruments that are actively traded. Their notional sizes are at least equal to $500 million.
Each issue included in the EMBI Global index must have at least 2.5 years until maturity when
it enters the index and at least one year until maturity to remain in the index. Moreover, JP
Morgan sets liquidity criteria such as easily accessible and verifiable daily prices either from an
inter-dealer broker or a certified JP Morgan source [see Cavanagh and Long (1999) for additional
information on the EMBI indices].
We rely on Standard and Poor’s credit ratings to assess the default probability of each
country. They take the form of letter grades ranging from AAA (highest credit worthiness) to
SD (selective default). They are available for a large set of countries over a long time period.
We collect Standard and Poor’s ratings for all the 41 countries in the EMBI index, except Cote
d’Ivoire and Iraq. We focus on ratings for long-term debt denominated in foreign currencies and
convert ratings into numbers ranging from 1 (highest credit worthiness) to 23 (lowest credit
worthiness).4 Our sample contains several default episodes.5
Ratings are not traded prices. This obvious fact has two consequences. First, ratings are
not tailored to a particular investor. For example, they are the same for a U.S. and a Japanese
investor. As a result, ratings do not not take into account the timing of a potential sovereign
default: a country that might default in good times for the U.S. has the same rating as a country
4The conversion from letters to numbers is the following: AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, AA = 3, AA- = 4, A+ = 5, A
= 6, A- = 7, BBB+ = 8, BBB = 9, BBB- = 10, BB+ = 11, BB = 12, BB- = 13, B+ = 14, B = 15, B- = 16,
CCC+ = 17, CCC = 18, CCC- = 19, CC+ = 20, CC = 21, CC- = 22, SD = 23.
5Argentina, Belize the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Russia and Uruguay and Venezuela defaulted on their
external debt during our sample period. Argentina was in default status from November 2001 to May 2005; Belize
from December 2006 to February 2007; the Dominican Republic from February 2005 to June 2005; Ecuador in
July 2000 for only one month and from December 2008 to June 2009; Russia from January 1999 to November
2000; Uruguay in May 2003 for only one month; and Venezuela from January 2005 to March 2005. In the event of
a default, as long as the affected instrument continues to satisfy the inclusion criteria, it remains in the index using
daily executable market prices. Pakistan, Indonesia, and Belize have also defaulted since 1993 but they entered the
EMBI dataset only after their defaults.
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that might default in bad times. Second, for most countries, credit ratings do not encompass
all the information on expected defaults. They are not updated on a regular basis, but rather
when new information or events suggest the need for additional Standard and Poor’s studies
and grade revisions.
It is common to rely on CDSs and debt-to-GDP ratios to complement the Standard and
Poor’s ratings. However, these two measures do not seem appropriate for our study. CDS are
insurance contracts against the event that a sovereign nation defaults on its debt over a given
horizon. These contracts are traded in U.S. dollars. As a result, their prices reflect both the
magnitude and the timing of expected defaults. More crucially, CDS data are only available
from 2001 on, and for a small subset of the EMBI Global countries with limited liquidity at
first [see Pan and Singleton (2008) for a study of three countries over the 2001-2006 period].
Debt-to-output ratios are available for a subset of countries at annual frequency. These ratios
do not predict default probabilities and returns as well as Standard and Poor’s ratings. To check,
however, that high debt levels do not drive our results, we report debt to output ratios. We
focus on public and publicly guaranteed external debt, which is most likely not collateralized,
consistent with our EMBI indices. Our series come from the World Bank Global Development
Finance indicators.
Notation Before turning to our portfolio-building strategy, we introduce some useful notation.
Let r e,i denote the log excess return of a U.S. investor who borrows funds in U.S. dollars at the
risk-free rate r f in order to buy country i ’s EMBI bond, then sells this bond after one month,
and pays back the debt. The log excess return is equal to:
r e,it+1 = p
i
t+1 − pit − r ft ,
where pit denotes the log market price of an EMBI bond in country i at date t. The bond beta
(β iEMBI) of each country i is the slope coefficient in a regression of EMBI bond excess returns
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on U.S. equity excess returns:
r e,it = α
i + β iEMBIr
e,m
t + εt ,
where r e,mt denotes the log total excess return on the MSCI U.S. equity index. Data are daily
and holding periods are one month. Betas are computed on 200-day rolling windows and their
time-series is denoted β iEMBI,t . As a timing convention, date-t betas are estimated with returns
up to date t. For each regression, betas exist only if at least 100 observations for both the left-
and right-hand side variables are available over the previous 200-day rolling window period.
III. B. Portfolios of EMBI Excess Returns
Sorts We build portfolios of EMBI excess returns by sorting countries along two dimensions:
their probabilities of defaults and their bond betas. First, at the end of each period t, we sort
all countries in the sample in two groups on the basis of their bond betas, βEMBI,t . The first
group contains the countries with the lowest βEMBI,t ; the second group contains the countries
with the highest βEMBI,t . Second, we sort all countries within each of the two groups into
three portfolios ranked from low to high probabilities of default; portfolios 1, 2, and 3 contain
countries with the lowest betas, while portfolios 4, 5, and 6 contain countries with the highest
betas. Portfolios 1 and 4 contain countries with the lowest default probabilities, while portfolios
3 and 6 contain countries with the highest default probabilities. Average ratings range from 7
(i.e., a Standard and Poor’s AA- rating) to 15 (i.e., a B rating). Portfolios are re-balanced at
the end of every month, using information available at that point. For example, Mexico turns
out to be a high beta country on average, while Thailand is a rather low beta country. This is
not very surprising considering the strong connection between the U.S. and Mexican economies.
The composition of portfolios changes every month, although there is stability in the portfolio
allocation. The probability of switching portfolios is close to 10% on average: countries change
portfolios every 10 months on average.
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We compute the EMBI excess return r e,jt+1 for portfolio j (j = 1, 2, ..., 6) by taking the
average of the EMBI excess returns between t and t + 1 that are in portfolio j . We need at
least six countries in the sample to build our six portfolios and thus start in January 1995. The
size of our sample varies over time, reaching a maximum of 35 countries.
Table 1 provides an overview of our six EMBI portfolios. For each portfolio j , we report
the average foreign bond beta βjEMBI (Panel A), the average Standard and Poor’s credit rating
(Panel B), the average total excess return r e,j (Panel C), and the average public external debt-
to-GDP ratio (Panel D). All returns are reported in U.S. dollars and the moments are annualized:
we multiply the means of monthly returns by 12 and standard deviations by
√
12. The Sharpe
ratio is the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation.
Average Excess Returns Our portfolios highlight two simple empirical facts that appear clearly
in Table 1. First, excess returns increase from low to high betas: portfolio 1, 2, and 3 (low betas)
offer lower excess returns than portfolios 4, 5, and 6 (high betas). The average excess return on
all the low beta portfolios is 494 basis points per annum. For the high beta portfolios, it is 1,061
basis points. As a result, there is on average a 567 basis points (i.e., 5.7%) difference between
the high and low beta portfolios. Bilateral comparisons (portfolio 1 vs. portfolio 4, 2 vs. 5, and
3 vs. 6) all show that, for similar credit ratings, high beta bonds always offer higher returns.
Second, excess returns also increase with default probabilities: portfolios 1 and 4 (low default
probabilities) offer lower excess returns than portfolios 3 and 6 (high default probabilities). For
low beta countries, the spread between low and high default probabilities entails a 317 basis
point difference in returns; this difference jumps to 619 basis points for high beta countries.
These spreads are economically significant, although standard errors on the averages are
large. We compute those standard errors by bootstrapping, assuming that returns are i .i .d., in
order to take into account the small sample size. Standard errors range from 175 to 509 basis
points per year. The average excess returns are at least two standard errors away from zero.
Focusing on the differences between high and low beta portfolios, once we control for ratings,
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Table 1: EMBI Portfolios Sorted on Credit Ratings and Bond Market Betas
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6
βjEMBI Low High
S&P Low Medium High Low Medium High
Panel A: EMBI Bond Market Beta, βjEMBI
Mean 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.39 0.47 0.64
Std. Dev. 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.31 0.38
Panel B: S&P Default Rating, dpj
Mean 7.15 9.60 13.10 10.05 12.25 15.22
Std. Dev. 1.52 1.00 1.03 1.68 0.96 1.47
Panel C: Excess Return, r e,j
Mean 3.75 4.13 6.92 8.44 8.78 14.62
s.e [1.75] [2.15] [2.76] [2.98] [3.90] [5.09]
Std. Dev. 7.34 9.08 11.42 11.80 15.25 20.72
SR 0.51 0.45 0.61 0.71 0.58 0.71
Panel D: Sovereign External Debt/GNP
Mean 0.11 0.16 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.33
Std. Dev. 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Notes: This table reports, for each portfolio j , the average beta βEMBI from a regression of EMBI excess returns on the U.S. stock
market excess returns (Panel A), the average Standard and Poor’s credit rating (Panel B), the average EMBI log total excess return
(Panel C), and the public external debt to GDP ratio (Panel D). Excess returns are annualized and reported in percentage points. For
excess returns, the table also reports standard errors on the averages, as well as standard deviations and Sharpe ratios, computed as
ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping, assuming that returns
are i .i .d . The portfolios are constructed by sorting EMBI countries on two dimensions: every month countries are sorted on their
probability of default, measured by the S&P credit rating, and on βEMBI . Note that Standard and Poor’s uses letter grades to describe
a country’s credit worthiness. We index Standard and Poor’s letter grade classification with numbers going from 1 to 23. Data are
monthly, from JP Morgan, Standard and Poor’s and the World Bank (Datastream). The sample period is 1/1995–5/2011.
we obtain an average spread of 468 basis points between portfolios 1 and 4, 465 basis points
between portfolios 2 and 5, and 770 basis points between portfolios 3 and 6. The small sample
standard errors on these spreads are respectively 230, 289, and 354 basis points. As a result,
spreads across portfolios are also close to two standard errors away from zero.
Patton and Timmermann (2010) propose a precise test of these cross-sectional properties.
We use their non-parametric test to examine whether there exists a monotonic mapping between
the observable variables used to sort EMBI countries into portfolios and expected returns. The
test rejects at standard significance levels the null of the absence of a monotonic relationship
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between portfolio ranks and returns against the alternative of an increasing pattern (the p-value
is 1.5%).
Other Moments We also check whether our portfolios differ in several other dimensions:
higher moments, debt levels, market capitalization, duration, and maturity.
Sovereign bond returns present large negative skewness and large positive kurtosis. Both
characteristics are due to the 1998 and 2008 crises.6 The low default probability portfolios
exhibit the most pronounced deviations from normality. The low skewness and high kurtosis of
these returns is reminiscent of crash risk. We do not, however, pursue a disaster risk explanation
of sovereign spreads, in the vein of Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2008), and Martin
(2008) because there is no significant difference in skewness or kurtosis between the high and
low beta portfolios. However, crash risk is an interesting avenue for future research on sovereign
bonds.
We obtain the largest difference in returns between high and low beta portfolios with poor
ratings (portfolios 3 and 6) while these two portfolios exhibit the same average debt level.
Ratings, however, appear related to debt levels, which increase inside each beta group. We
obtain similar results with other debt indices. Total external debt (also from the World Bank)
and net general government debt (from the IMF) levels tend to increase inside each beta group,
but net general government debt levels are lower in portfolio 6 than in portfolio 3.
Our benchmark portfolios tend to differ also in terms of market capitalization, duration, and
maturity. These differences may account for part of the cross-section of excess returns across
portfolios, but they are unlikely to explain the whole cross-section of excess returns.
High beta, high default probability portfolios tend to have lower market capitalizations than
their low beta counterpart. Their higher returns may thus correspond to potential liquidity risk
6These characteristics are also apparent at the country level. Some countries like Hungary, Malaysia, and
Thailand exhibit very large kurtosis. The same three countries present the largest positive skewness measures.
Clearly, our sample comprises two large crises: the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the mortgage crisis in 2008–
2009. Both crises implied first sharp increases in EMBI spreads (i.e., lower emerging market bond prices) and thus
very low returns.
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premia. Yet, inside each beta group, there is no monotonic variation in market capitalization
even though returns increase with default probabilities (as measured by low ratings) and there
is no difference in market capitalization between other low and high beta portfolios. Mapping
market capitalizations into returns is thus not obvious, but liquidity remains a valid concern and
we explore it further below.
We also note that our portfolios differ in terms of duration and maturities. Portfolios with
high betas and high default probabilities (low ratings) tend to exhibit longer durations and
maturities. These higher durations may also explain part of the cross-section of returns. The
difference in duration is, however, limited (from 5.2 years for the first portfolio to 6.4 years for the
last portfolio). A pure term premium, as measured for example from the U.S. government bond
yield curve, is unlikely to account for the large spread in returns that we observe on emerging
markets sovereign bonds. The spread in returns between 5- and 7- year U.S. government bonds
(0.4%) is an order of magnitude smaller than the spread we obtain between our first and last
portfolios (above 10%). Term premia certainly matter, but they must interact with sovereign
risk premia in order to account for the cross-section of EMBI returns. On a sample of 11
emerging markets, Broner et al. (2010) estimate that the excess returns on 9-year bonds are on
average 1.5% higher than on 6-year bonds. Again, this spread is much lower than the one we
obtain between our corner portfolios.
Transaction Costs Finally, note that our average returns do not take into account transaction
costs. Unfortunately, we do not have bid-ask spreads on EMBI indices and JP Morgan does
not make the historical composition of the EMBI indices publicly available. Transaction costs,
however, are important, and would reduce the Sharpe ratios on these portfolios. We obtain an
order of magnitudes for these transaction costs using emerging market sovereign bonds available
in Bloomberg. These bond prices are not as reliable as the JP Morgan indices. They contain
clear outliers and our data set does not conform to the strict liquidity requirements that JP
Morgan enforces. But they offer a glimpse at transaction costs on sovereign emerging markets.
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Building portfolios of equally-weighted individual bonds (using the same methodology as for
indices), we obtain median bid-ask spreads ranging from 40 basis points to 64 basis points.
These transaction costs impact the overall level but do not seem to affect the spread in
returns. We use here a simple back-of-the-envelop approach. Our portfolios exhibit an average
of 10 changes per year. Assuming an average bid-ask spread of 50 basis points (equal to the
median spread observed on Bloomberg prices), transaction costs would amount to 500 basis
points per year and per portfolio. They would reduce our cross-section of excess returns from
the 2.6% to 14.6% range to the -2.4% to 9.6% range. Note that there is no difference in
transaction costs between the first and last portfolio; the median bid-ask spreads are 60.4 basis
points vs. 63.6 basis points. Bid-ask spreads thus have no significant impact on the difference
between corner portfolios. Even if we were to assume a difference of 200 basis points per year
across portfolios (although, again, without any evidence pointing in this direction), the spread
in returns would only decrease from 12% to 10%. It is thus highly unlikely that transaction
costs would eliminate the cross-section of excess returns we report. We acknowledge that these
numbers are back-of-the-envelop estimates: we cannot rule out a larger or smaller impact of
transaction costs on our EMBI returns since we do not – and cannot – have the exact same
individual bonds and weights that JP Morgan used to build EMBI series. Yet, the liquidity filters
used by JP Morgan suggest that our estimates transaction costs are certainly conservative.
We note that liquidity and term premia may differ systematically across our portfolios and
that these risk premia may account for at least part of the cross-section of excess returns. We
do not disentangle sovereign risk from liquidity and term risk premia; doing so is beyond the
scope of this paper. We also note that the lower skewness and higher kurtosis of the low beta
portfolios may be indicative of “peso” explanations of excess returns: in this logic, high average
returns in sample simply correspond to luck, with large and negative returns waiting to happen,
such that all excess returns would be zero in a very long sample. Although many countries in
our sample have experienced difficult economic times and actual defaults, “peso” explanations
are a valid concern in small samples. We examine this issue thoroughly: we rely on both an
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empirical asset pricing exercise (Section IV) and model simulations (Section VI) to show that
“peso” stories are very unlikely explanations of our findings.
III. C. Robustness Checks
We end this section with several robustness checks, considering different weights and different
sorts.
Value-Weighted Value-weighted (instead of equally-weighted) portfolios built using market
betas and credit ratings deliver a cross-section of excess returns similar to our benchmark. Our
results are not driven by a few small countries with exceptional returns.
S&P “Outlook” S&P “Outlooks,” which assess the potential direction of future ratings,
augment the precision of S&P ratings. “Outlooks” are converted into numbers that modify the
current ratings. This additional information does not modify substantially our results.
Index Composition The composition of the EMBI indices changes over time. As a result, risk
characteristics of the indices could potentially change because of large changes in duration. To
address this issue, we exploit duration time series available starting in January 2004 and exclude
from the sample, for each country, the three months around each change in duration of more
than three years. Dropping those periods does not significantly change our results.
Bond Betas We also find a similar cross-section when we use bond betas and credit ratings.
The bond market betas correspond to slope coefficients in regressions of sovereign bond returns
on U.S. BBB corporate bond excess returns.7 Here again, high beta sovereign bonds tend to
7We do not attempt here to summarize the large literature on corporate spreads. See Giesecke, Longstaff,
Schaefer and Strebulaev (2011) for a survey and long historical time-series, see Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek
(2009) and Philippon (2009) for recent evidence on the link between credit spreads and macroeconomic variables,
and see Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010) for a recent model with counter-cyclical corporate spreads.
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offer higher excess returns. The cross-section of excess returns is very similar to the one in
Table 1.
Ratings Rating agencies offer only imperfect measures of default probabilities. We thus check
the robustness of our findings by using different rating agencies or CDS rates. Moody’s and
Fitch’s ratings lead to similar results as in our benchmark sample, i.e. large differences in excess
returns between low and high beta portfolios for each rating dimension. CDS prices offer a
high-frequency and market-based proxy for risk-weighted expected default probabilities but are
available for a much smaller number of countries (27 maximum) and a shorter time window
(from March 2003 to May 2011 at best). We obtain, again, large differences in excess returns
between low and high beta portfolios for each CDS price dimension. Thus, it is unlikely that our
cross-section of excess returns along the beta-dimension is simply due to mis-measured default
probabilities.
Constant Betas Sorting on sovereign betas and rebalancing portfolios is the key innovation
of this section. We run two additional experiments to make this point. First, we sort countries
on average bond betas, instead of time-varying betas, maintaining the same sample as for our
benchmark portfolios. For each country, we compute the average of all its time-varying betas.
We obtain a cross-section of excess returns, albeit smaller than with time-varying betas. The
caveat is that such portfolios exhibit forward-looking bias: in order to compute the mean beta,
we use information not available to the investor. Second, in order to avoid the forward-looking
bias, we fix each country’s beta to the first available value in our sample. As a result, we maintain
the same sample as before, but the betas are now constant for each country and known at the
time of the investment decision. If we sort portfolios using these fixed betas, we do not obtain
a clear cross-section of excess returns. The reason is that there is time-variation in actual betas
and these dynamics are informative about returns.
Overall, our results appear very robust. There is a clear difference in average excess returns
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between the high and low beta portfolios. At the end of the next section, we also run asset
pricing tests at the country level to check that our results are not mechanically driven by our
portfolio building exercise. They are not. Portfolios simply offer a convenient way to focus on
systematic risk.
To summarize this section, by sorting countries along their Standard and Poor’s ratings and
market betas, we have obtained a rich cross-section of average excess returns. We now turn to
the dynamic properties of these portfolio returns.
IV. Systematic Risk in EMBI Excess Returns
In this section, we show that covariances of sovereign bond returns with either U.S. stock market
returns or U.S. corporate bond returns account for a large share of our cross-section of average
excess returns.
IV. A. Asset Pricing Methodology
Linear factor models of asset pricing predict that average excess returns on a cross-section of
assets can be attributed to risk premia associated with their exposure to a small number of risk
factors. In the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross (1976), these factors capture common variation
in individual asset returns. We test this prediction on sovereign bond returns.
Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing We use Re,jt+1 to denote the average excess return for a U.S.
investor on portfolio j in period t + 1. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, there exists a
strictly positive discount factor such that this excess return has a zero price and satisfies the
following Euler equation:
Et [Mt+1R
e,j
t+1] = 0,
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where M denotes the stochastic discount factor (SDF) of the U.S. investor. We further assume
that the log stochastic discount factor m is linear in the pricing factors f :
mt+1 = 1− b(ft+1 − µ),
where b is the vector of factor loadings and µ denotes the factor means. This linear factor
model implies a beta pricing model: the log expected excess return is equal to the factor price
λ times the beta of each portfolio βj :
E[r˜ e,j ] = λ′βj ,
where r˜ e,j denotes the log excess return on portfolio j corrected for its Jensen term, Σf f is the
variance-covariance matrix of the factors, λ = Σf f b, and β
j denotes the regression coefficients
of the returns Re,j on the factors. To estimate the factor prices λ and the portfolio betas β,
we use two different procedures: a generalized method of moments (GMM) applied to linear
factor models, following Hansen (1982), and a two-stage (OLS) estimation, following Fama and
MacBeth (1973), henceforth FMB.
We use a single risk factor to account for the returns on our EMBI portfolios. This risk
factor is either the log total return on the U.S. stock market or the log total return on the
Merrill Lynch U.S. BBB corporate bond index. The Euler equation thus implies that expected
excess returns are fully explained by the covariances between bond returns and the risk factor.
We interpret past ratings and past betas as signals on those key covariances and we show that,
even if we formed portfolios on two dimensions, we can account for the cross-section of excess
returns with a unique risk factor. This is also true in the model presented in the next section.
Before we jump to our results, let us pause to think more precisely about the validity of our
asset pricing experiment, particularly its generalization to foreign investors.
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Foreign Investors According to the 2008 survey of U.S. Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Secu-
rities published by the U.S. Treasury, U.S. investors own $42 billion of long-term government
debt issued in U.S. dollars by the emerging countries in our sample. U.S. investors are not the
only buyers of sovereign bonds: they only own a fraction of all EMBI bonds, whose total market
capitalization was $243 billions at the end of 2008. Our empirical work does not assume that
U.S. investors are the only buyers of sovereign bonds.
For our asset pricing experiment to be valid, we only need to assume free-portfolio formation
and the law of one price. These two conditions, which are fairly general and even less restrictive
than the absence of arbitrage, are enough in order to postulate the existence of a SDF that prices
our returns [see Cochrane (2001), chapter 4]. Under these conditions, there exists a unique SDF
in the space of traded assets. Our objective is then to find a reasonable approximation of this
SDF.
Our results can be extended to non-U.S. investors who also buy emerging market sovereign
bonds. The extension to foreign investors is straightforward if all shocks that affect U.S. and
foreign investors are spanned by financial markets. Let us illustrate this point through a simple
example.
Assume that U.K. investors buy Argentinean sovereign bonds. Let Q denote the real ex-
change rate in U.S. good per U.K. good. When Q increases, the dollar depreciates in real terms.
Let rU.K.t+1 = rt+1−∆qt+1 denote the log return of a U.K. investor buying sovereign bonds issued
in U.S. dollars (i.e., paying U.S. goods). We now consider two cases.
In the first case, we assume that all U.S. and U.K. shocks are spanned by financial markets,
i.e., markets are complete across these two countries. In this case, the change in the real
exchange rate corresponds to the ratio of the foreign to domestic SDFs.8 If sovereign bonds
are priced from the perspective of U.S. investors, then they are also priced for U.K. investors:
8The proof is simple. For any return R? (measured in U.K. goods), the Euler equations of the U.K. and U.S.
investors hold:
Et [Mt+1R
?
t+1Qt+1/Qt ] = 1 and Et [M
U.K.
t+1 R
?
t+1] = 1.
When markets are complete, the SDF is unique. This implies that: Qt+1/Qt = M
U.K.
t+1 /Mt+1.
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Pt = Et [Mt+1Xt+1] implies Pt/Qt = Et [M
U.K.
t+1 Xt+1/Qt+1]. Assuming lognormality, we can then
decompose the expected excess return of U.K. investors as the sum of two risk premia:
Et(r
U.K.
t+1 )− r f ,U.K.t +
1
2
V art(r
U.K.
t+1 ) = −covt(mt+1, rt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U.S. sovereign risk premium
− covt(mU.K.t+1 ,−∆qt+1) +
1
2
V art(∆qt+1),︸ ︷︷ ︸
currency risk premium
where r f ,U.K. denotes the risk-free rate in the U.K. The sovereign risk premium (the first term
on the right-hand side) is the one we study in this paper. The currency risk premium does not
depend here on emerging market defaults and can be studied separately. Our assumption of
lognormality is for expositional clarity only.
In the second case, financial markets are incomplete, i.e., they do not span all the shocks
between the U.S. and the U.K. Here, an additional risk premium appears on the right-hand side
of the above equation. It corresponds to the covariance between the sovereign bond return in
an emerging country and the difference in log SDFs that is not spanned by changes in exchange
rates: −covt(rt+1, mU.K.t+1 −mt+1 − ∆qt+1). In other terms, an additional risk premium exists if
defaults in Argentina, for example, affect the U.S. and U.K. economies differently and if this
difference is not captured by the U.S./U.K. exchange rate. It is an interesting case, but we do
not know of any model where it arises.
If exchange rates are defined as the ratio of two pricing kernels (i.e., if markets are complete
across foreign investors, which is most likely among developed countries), then our asset pricing
experiment offers the most direct measure of sovereign risk premia. Sovereign bonds can be
bought by other investors too: the foreign stochastic discount factor that prices sovereign
bonds from a foreign investor’s perspective is the U.S. pricing kernel multiplied by the change
in exchange rates. In order to take the perspective of other investors, the exchange rate risk
needs to be added. We check that the same sovereign portfolios are priced using global equity
or bond indices of developed countries. The case of incomplete markets is more difficult and we
leave it for future research. Instead, we show now that the Euler equation for a U.S. investor
offers new insights on emerging markets’ sovereign debt.
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IV. B. Asset Pricing Results
Table 2 reports our asset pricing results. Panel A reports estimates of the market price of risk λ
and the SDF factor loadings b, the adjusted R2, the square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE
and the p-values of χ2 tests (in percentage points). The left-hand side of the table reports
results obtained with the U.S. stock market return as sole risk factor, while the right-hand side
of the table pertains to results obtained with the U.S. BBB bond return as sole risk factor.
Market Prices of Risk Panel A shows that the market price of equity risk is equal to 2,047
basis points per annum. The FMB standard error is 704 basis points. The market price of bond
risk is 722 basis points, with a standard error of 249 basis points. In both cases, the risk price is
more than two standard errors away from zero, and thus highly statistically significant. Overall,
asset pricing errors are small. The square root of the mean squared errors (RMSE) are either
100 or 131 basis points and the cross-sectional R2s are either 90% or 84%. The null that the
pricing errors are zero cannot be rejected, regardless of the estimation procedure and regardless
of the risk factors.
Since both risk factors are returns, the no arbitrage condition implies that the risk prices
should be equal to the factor average excess returns. This condition stems from the fact that
the Euler equation applies to each risk factor too, which clearly has a regression coefficient β
of 1 on itself. On the one hand, the market price of equity risk is much higher than the equity
excess return in our sample (529 basis points). Standard errors are large but the market price
and the mean excess returns differ at the 10% confidence level. On the other hand, the market
price of bond risk is higher but not statistically different from the mean excess return of the
factor, so the no-arbitrage condition is not rejected. The price of risk in sovereign bond markets
in U.S. dollars appears consistent with its U.S. corporate bond counterpart.
Figure 1 plots predicted against realized excess returns for the six EMBI portfolios. The left
(right) panel uses the U.S. stock (bond) market as the risk factor. The fit obtained with a bond
return is less tight, but the implied market price of risk is reasonable.
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Alphas and Betas in EMBI Returns Panel B of Table 2 reports the constants (denoted
αj) and the slope coefficients (denoted βjUS−Mkt or β
j
USBBB
) obtained by running time-series
regressions of each portfolio’s excess returns r˜ xe,j on a constant and the U.S. stock market or
U.S. bond risk factors.
Table 2 shows that the αs are small and not significantly different from zero. The null that
the αs are jointly zero cannot be rejected. The second column reports the βs for our risk factors.
The equity βs increase from 0.12 to 0.31 for the low βEMBI group, while for the second βEMBI
group they increase from 0.37 for portfolio 4 to 0.70 for portfolio 6. The bond βs increase from
0.76 to 0.87 for the low βEMBI group, while for the second βEMBI group they increase from 1.06
for portfolio 4 to 1.84 for portfolio 6. Betas align with average excess returns for two reasons:
pre-formation betas predict post-formation betas, and bonds with higher default probabilities
tend to load more on the risk factors. Comparing portfolios 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6, we
note that asset pricing (i.e., post-formation) betas are always higher in the second group.
Table 2 reports two p-values: in Panel A, the null hypothesis is that all the cross-sectional
pricing errors are zero. These cross-sectional pricing errors correspond to the distance between
expected excess returns and the 45-degree line in the classic asset pricing graph (expected
excess returns as a function of realized excess returns). In Panel B, the null hypothesis is that
all intercepts in the time-series regressions of returns on risk factors are jointly zero. We report
p-values computed as 1 minus the value of the chi-square cumulative distribution function (for
a given chi-square statistic and a given degree of freedom). As a result, large pricing errors or
large constants in the time-series imply large chi-square statistics and low p-values. A p-value
below 5% means that we can reject the null hypothesis that all pricing errors or constants in the
time-series are jointly zero.
IV. C. Extensions
To sum up, we find that the large cross-section of EMBI portfolio returns corresponds to covari-
ances of EMBI returns with risk factors, not luck. We now check the robustness of this result
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Figure 1: Predicted versus Realized Average Excess Returns
The figure plots realized average EMBI portfolio excess returns on the vertical axis against predicted average excess returns on the
horizontal axis. The left panel uses the U.S. stock market as risk factor, while the right panel uses the U.S.-BBB bond return as risk
factor. We regress each portfolio j ’s actual excess returns on a constant and our risk factor to obtain the slope coefficient βj . Each
predicted excess return then corresponds to the OLS estimate βj multiplied by the estimated market price of risk. All returns are
annualized. Data are monthly. The sample period is 1/1995–5/2011.
and consider potential extensions. We first rapidly describe the results obtained on different
samples of portfolios and on country-level returns. We then turn to tests of the conditional
Euler equation and tests of liquidity risk.
Different Samples We run the same asset pricing tests on a different set of portfolios: the
EMBI returns sorted on U.S. bond (not stock) market betas and credit ratings. Using the same
risk factors as before, results are very similar.
We also consider a smaller time-window of our benchmark portfolios, ending the sample in
May 2007, i.e. before the mortgage crisis. The market prices of risk are positive and significant.
They are a bit higher than in the whole sample and RMSE are larger. The null that pricing
errors are zero cannot be rejected. The recent crisis features an increase in EMBI betas and
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thus tends to decrease the estimated market prices of risk. It brings them closer to the mean of
the risk factors. But the crisis does not drive our main result; we would have reached a similar
conclusion in a pre-crisis sample.
Country-level Results Our approach is the standard one in finance: there is nothing magic
about our portfolios; they simply average out idiosyncratic risk and allow us to focus on risk
premia. We stress that our results are not mechanically driven by our portfolio building exercise.
To show this point, we run panel regressions and asset pricing tests at the country-level.
We run the original Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure on country-level excess returns.
This procedure does not correspond to implementable trading strategies (unlike our portfolios)
but it confirms our previous results: the market prices of risk are positive and significant. The
market price of equity risk is 2,228 basis points, close to the portfolio estimate. It is higher than
the mean equity excess return. The market price of bond risk is 747 basis points, again close
to the portfolio estimate. It is not statistically different from the mean excess return on the
U.S. BBB risk factor. In both cases, the square root of the mean squared errors and the mean
absolute pricing errors are much larger than on portfolios—no averaging out of idiosyncratic risk
here— but the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero cannot be rejected.
In panel tests, country-level EMBI excess return load significantly on the risk factors. In both
cases, the worse the rating, the higher the loading on the risk factor. This result is robust and
appears with or without country fixed effects. The slope coefficients are at least two standard
errors away from 0. Country-level results are thus fully consistent with our main portfolio results.
We now consider two potential extensions.
Foreign Investors We find similar results as before when check that our portfolio returns are
priced from the perspective of foreign investors.9 The market price of world equity risk is positive
9We use the MSCI World Index, which, despite its name, focuses on the equity market performance of 24
developed markets. We use the Bank of America Merrill Lynch BBB Global Corporate Index, which aggregates
Canadian, Japanese, U.K., and U.S. corporate bonds. This bond index is only available starting in December 1996.
These two indices are expressed in U.S. dollars.
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and significant, but higher than the mean of the world equity excess return. The RMSE are
almost the same as those obtained with the U.S. equity return. The market price of world bond
risk is also positive and significant. At 7.12%, it is two standard errors away from zero, and less
than one standard error above the mean of the bond excess return (4.16%). The RMSE are
higher than those obtained with the U.S. bond index (167 basis points vs. 130 basis points),
but we still cannot reject at 5% the null hypothesis that pricing errors are zero. The time-series
constants are jointly insignificant.
Conditioning Information We find that the implied market prices of risk vary significantly
through time: they tend to increase in bad times, when the implied U.S. stock market volatility
is high. The conditional market price of risk (i.e., the one associated with the bond or equity
returns multiplied by the lagged VIX index) are more than two standard errors away from zero.
Time-varying risk-aversion is a potential interpretation of this finding. In bad times, investors
are risk-averse and require a larger compensation per unit of risk. But a rise in the VIX index is
also often associated with poor market liquidity.
Liquidity Risk In order to check if portfolio returns compensate investors for bearing some
liquidity risk, two additional risk factors are considered: the change in the log VIX index and
the TED spread, defined as the difference between Eurodollar yields and Treasury Bills, both at
3-month horizons. These two variables are often used to proxy for liquidity risk, even though
they also capture some credit risk and/or time-varying risk aversion. They are added (one at
the time) to our previous equity and bond factors.
We obtain mixed results. The change in the VIX index and the TED have, as expected,
negative market prices of risk. The market price of risk of the VIX is borderline significant
(when associated with the bond market return, not with the stock market), while the one of the
TED spread is not. In the time-series, four out of six portfolio returns load significantly on the
change in the VIX index but only the last portfolio loads significantly on the TED spread.
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Disentangling liquidity risk from credit risk and time-varying risk aversion is the focus of
a large literature and is beyond the scope of this paper. We do not rule out a liquidity-based
explanation of EMBI returns, but our asset pricing results point towards a credit risk explanation,
with a role for time-varying risk aversion.
V. Macroeconomic Impact of Sovereign Risk Premia
By sorting countries along their Standard and Poor’s ratings and bond betas, we have obtained
a cross-section of average excess returns that reflects different risk exposures: countries with
high EMBI market betas offer higher excess returns. What does this risk premium imply for
the amount of debt and the decision to default? We now provide a numerical illustration of a
model with endogenous default and time-varying risk premia in order to study the implications
of systematic risk on debt quantities and defaults.
We start from the seminal two-country model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and its recent
version in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). We depart from the previous
literature and assume that lenders are risk averse, instead of being risk-neutral, and that emerging
countries’ business cycles differ in their correlations to the U.S. business cycle. This simple
departure has key implications on sovereign bond prices and quantities. We do not claim that this
framework is the only one able to account for our empirical findings, but it offers a fully-specified
laboratory to understand our asset pricing results and study their macroeconomic implications.
In the model, there are N-1 small, emerging open economies, and one large developed
economy. Our “small open economy” assumption is key: as in the papers above, the borrowing
and default decisions of the small open economies have no impact on the large economy or
on any other small economy. We solve for the optimal borrowing and default decision of each
small economy, considering that the large economy is able to provide funds as requested. We
introduce many small open economies in order to reproduce on simulated data the exact same
portfolio and asset pricing experiments we report in the first sections of this paper. As the model
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shares many features of its predecessors, we present it succinctly, focusing on its novel aspects.
We first describe our setup and then turn to our calibration.
V. A. Endowments
The superscript i denotes variables corresponding to one of the N-1 small open economies.
Upper case variables denote levels, lower case variables denote logs.
In each small open economy, there is a representative agent who receives a stochastic en-
dowment stream. Endowments are composed of a transitory component z it and a time-varying
mean (or permanent component) Γ it . Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) considered each component
separately; we consider them together in order to obtain both significant debt levels and yield
spreads. Endowments evolve as Y it = e
z itΓ it . The transitory component, z
i
t follows an AR(1)
around a long run mean µz :
z it = µz(1− αz) + αzz it−1 + z,it .
The time-varying mean is described by: Γ it = G
i
tΓ
i
t−1, where:
g it = log(G
i
t) = µg(1− αg) + αgg it−1 + g,it .
Note that a positive shock g,i implies a permanent higher level of output. We assume that
g,i and z,i are i .i .d normal and that shocks to the transitory and permanent components are
orthogonal (E(g,i
′
z,i) = 0). All emerging countries have the same endowment persistence and
volatility: E([z,i ]2) = σ2z and E([
g,i ]2) = σ2g.
In the large developed economy, there is a representative agent that receives every period an
exogenous endowment. Again, we assume that consumption in the large developed economy
is not affected by the small emerging countries. There is, for example, no feedback effect
of defaults on lenders’ consumption. We assume that idiosyncratic shocks to the lenders’
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consumption growth are i .i .d. log-normally distributed with mean g and volatility σ:
∆ct = g + t .
We do not introduce a time-varying mean in the consumption growth of the large economy in
order to limit the number of state variables and because consumption growth is closer to i .i .d.
in developed economies.
Emerging countries only differ according to their conditional correlation to the developed
economy: E(z
i ′
) = ρi . This is the key source of heterogeneity across countries in our model.
Such heterogeneity exists in the data. Correlation coefficients between foreign and U.S. HP-
filtered GDP series range in our sample from -0.3 to 0.6 on annual data, and from -0.3 to
0.5 on quarterly data. We thus assume that ρ varies between −0.5 and 0.5. This source of
heterogeneity allows us to study the impact of default risk premia on optimal quantities and
prices.
In the data, market betas are time-varying. In the model, however, we keep the correlation
between the lenders and borrowers’ endowment shocks constant. The simulated betas can still
vary slightly because they are estimated on rolling windows of past U.S. equity and foreign bond
returns, as we do on actual data. Time-varying mean growth rates of borrowers and time-varying
risk-aversion of lenders introduce time-variation in the betas. We could, of course, extend the
model by introducing variable correlation coefficients without changing its main message.
All variables in the model are real, and we abstract from monetary policies. In each emerg-
ing economy, a benevolent government maximizes the welfare of its representative household.
We thus describe the preferences of the representative agent and considers that the govern-
ment seeks to maximize them. To do so, the government can borrow resources from the
developed country. The government, however, can only trade non contingent one-period zero-
coupon bonds. These debt contracts are not enforceable: governments can choose to default
on sovereign debt at any point in time.
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V. B. Borrowers
Preferences The representative borrower in each small open economy maximizes the stream
of discounted utilities U it :
10
U i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU it = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(C it)
1−γ
1− γ ,
where C it denotes consumption at time t and β denotes the time discount factor. Note that β
corresponds to the usual notation in macroeconomics, not the finance betas that we computed
in the previous section. Since many models in macroeconomics do not give much attention
to risk premia, these two notational habits have developed separately. More importantly, and
as is common in the literature, we let lenders’ and borrowers’ discount factors differ: polit-
ical economists argue that politicians tend to have shorter time horizons in small developing
countries.11
Budget Constraint The representative household receives a stochastic stream of the tradable
good Y it in every period. The representative agent also receives a goods transfer from the
government in a lump-sum fashion (i.e., any proceeds from international operations are rebated
lump-sum from the government to its citizens). The government has access to international
capital markets: at the beginning of period t, it can purchase Bit,t+1 one-period zero-coupon
bonds at price Qt . B
i
t,t+1 denotes the quantity of one-period zero-coupon bonds purchased at
date t and coming to maturity at date t + 1. A negative value Bit,t+1 < 0 implies borrowing
QtB
i
t,t+1 units of goods at t and promising to repay, conditional on not defaulting, B
i
t,t+1 units
of t + 1 good. The representative household’s budget constraint conditional on not defaulting
10Although we use habit preferences to describe lenders, we keep standard preferences to describe borrowers for
two reasons. First, unlike for developed economies, there is not much evidence of large Sharpe ratios measured
in units of emerging markets’ goods. As a result, there is no clear need for volatile stochastic discount factors.
Second, departing from standard preferences entails large computational costs, because it adds at least one state
variable. We thus leave the extension to non-standard preferences for future research.
11In Amador (2008), for example, a low value for the discount factor β corresponds to the high short-term
discount rate of an incumbent party with low probability of remaining in power in a model where different parties
alternate.
31
at time t is then:
C it = Y
i
t −QitBit,t+1 + Bit−1,t . (1)
Default Costs In case of default, the sovereign cannot selectively default on parts of its debt,
and thus all current debt disappears. A sovereign that defaults at date t is excluded from
international capital markets for a stochastic number of periods and suffers a direct output loss.
In this case, consumption is constrained by the value of output during autarky, which is denoted
Y i ,def aultt , and the budget constraint is simply:
C it = Y
i ,def ault
t . (2)
Mendoza and Yue (2008) propose a model where sovereign defaults endogenously produce
output costs that are an increasing, strictly convex function of productivity shocks. In line
with their work and following Arellano (2008), we assume an asymmetric direct output cost of
default: Y i ,def aultt = min{Y it , (1− θ)Y i}, where Y i is the mean output level and θ a measure of
the default cost.12
This assumption implies that defaults are more costly in good times; it thus affects both the
size and the timing of debt in equilibrium. The intuition is simple. If the country defaults, its
consumption is set to be low for the entire time of exclusion from capital markets according to
the budget constraint in Equation (2). The drop in consumption is particularly large when the
endowment is high. Hence, in good times, the utility cost of default (which lasts several periods)
is likely to outweigh the utility benefit from not repaying the outstanding debt (which lasts one
period) and the country has less incentives to default. In general equilibrium, lenders take that
cost into account, and sovereign countries can borrow more in good times, a robust feature of
emerging economies’ business cycles [e.g., Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006),
and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)]. It also implies that countries tend to default when output is
12Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume a symmetric output cost of default; it delivers qualitatively similar results
but the implied cross-section of sovereign bond returns is smaller.
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below trend, as they actually do (Tomz, 2007).
V. C. Lenders
Lenders receive an exogenous stochastic endowment every period denoted Ct . They are risk-
averse. In order to reproduce the large spread in returns between low and high beta countries,
we rely on Campbell and Cochrane (1999) external habit preferences.13 We assume that lenders
maximize the stream of discounted utilities Ut :
U = Et
∞∑
t=0
δtUt = Et
∞∑
t=0
δt
(Ct −Ht)1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
where δ denotes the lenders’ discount factor and Ht the external habit or subsistence level,
which depends on past consumption.
Why Not Power Utility? A model where borrowers and lenders share the same constant
relative risk-aversion preferences does not produce a large enough spread in excess returns for
reasonable risk-aversion parameters. This result parallels the equity premium puzzle in Mehra
and Prescott (1985).
For illustration, assume that two countries share the same default probability and the same
yield volatility. Then spreads between their bond returns depend on the covariance between the
U.S. marginal utility of consumption and return differences. As a result, the maximum spread
between these two countries is twice the product of the risk-aversion coefficient multiplied by
the standard deviation of consumption growth (around 1.5%) and the standard deviation of
the returns (around 13%). A risk-aversion coefficient of 2 would imply a maximum spread of
around 80 basis points. This maximum spread is only attained when the correlation coefficients
13A large literature in finance study the role of habit preferences in the resolution of the equity premium puzzle.
We do not attempt to summarize it here. We focus on examples of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit pref-
erences. Recently, Wachter (2006) considers their implications for the term structure; Chen, Colin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2008) focus on credit spreads, and Verdelhan (2010) on exchange rates. Garleanu and Panageas (2008)
propose a model that is observationally similar to Campbell and Cochrane (1999) but based on heterogenous agents
with finite lives.
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between each sovereign bond return and lenders’ pricing kernels is 1 and -1, which is an unlikely
extreme event. For an average correlation of 0.3, the maximum spread is 24 basis points. In
order to generate a spread of 500 basis points as in the data, the model requires a very high
risk-aversion coefficient. But it would then imply an implausible and volatile risk-free rate. This
is the risk-free rate puzzle again. For a model that seeks to replicate the spread between the
emerging market rate and the U.S. risk-free rate, it is a serious concern.
On the contrary, the introduction of habit preferences implies that lenders’ risk-aversion is
endogenously time-varying, and higher in adverse economies. As consumption declines toward
the habit level, the curvature of the utility function rises, so risky assets prices fall and expected
returns rise. Local risk aversion is sometimes very high, even if the risk-aversion coefficient
remains low. The real interest rate is constant and equal to the mean real interest rate in the
data.
Habit Preferences Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999), we assume that the external
habit level depends on consumption growth through the following autoregressive process for the
surplus consumption ratio, defined as the percentage gap between the endowment and habit
levels (St ≡ [Ct −Ht ]/Ct):
st+1 = (1− φ)s + φst + λ(st)(∆ct+1 − g),
where s denotes the log surplus-consumption ratio, which is an autoregressive process with a
persistence of φ. The sensitivity function λ(st) describes how habits are formed from past
aggregate consumption.14 In this framework, adverse economic conditions are periods of low
14The sensitivity function λ(st) governs the dynamic of the surplus consumption ratio:
λ(st) =
{
1
S
√
1− 2(st − s)− 1 if st ≤ smax ,
0 elsewhere,
where smax is the upper bound of the log surplus-consumption ratio. S measures the steady-state gap (in percent-
age) between consumption and habit levels. Note that the non-linearity of the surplus consumption ratio keeps
habits always below consumption and marginal utilities always positive and finite. Assuming that S = σ
√
γ
1−φ and
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surplus consumption ratios s (when consumption is close to the habit level or subsistence level),
and “negative shocks” refer to negative consumption growth shocks .
Time-varying Risk Aversion This model implies constant risk-free rates and time-varying
risk-aversion for the lenders. Since the habit level depends on aggregate consumption, the local
curvature of the lenders’ utility function is γt = γ/St . When the endowment is close to the
subsistence level, the surplus consumption ratio is low and the lender is very risk-averse. The
model implies a counter-cyclical market price of risk and is thus potentially consistent with our
asset pricing results: in the data, market prices of risk also increase in bad times, as measured
by a high value of the VIX index, which is often referred to as the “fear index” of investors. We
interpret high levels of fear as high levels of risk aversion. Note, however, that this model does not
produce enough variation in the conditional Sharpe ratio to match its empirical counterpart on
stock markets [see Lettau and Ludvigson (2009) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2010) for additional
evidence].
Lenders supply any quantity of funds demanded by the small open economy, but they require
compensation for the risk they bear. Lenders cannot default. When lenders are risk-neutral,
they charge the borrower the interest rate that makes them break-even in expected value: in
this case, emerging market yields can be high but expected excess returns are zero by definition.
In our model, lenders are risk-averse, and require not only a default premium, but also a default
risk premium. They expect a higher return on average if defaults are more likely when their
endowment is close to their subsistence level.
V. D. Default Sets and Bond Prices
The model has four state variables: two state variables describe the lender’s endowment (for
the z and g processes), one describes the borrower’s surplus consumption ratio (s, and thus
tracks risk-aversion), and the last one describes the amount of debt at the start of the period
smax = s + (1− S)/2, the sensitivity function leads to a constant risk-free rate: r f = − log(δ) + γg − γ2σ2
2S
2 .
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(B). We stack the first three variables in a vector x . The default probability dp is endogenous
and depends on the amount of outstanding debt B and on the endowment realization x . Each
period, the government first decides to repay its debt or not. If it repays its debt, then it can
borrow again.
Figure 2 plots optimal default policy sets D(B) as a function of the beginning-of-period
asset positions B and the endowment shocks z . We consider two different levels of the mean
growth rate g: −3.4% and 4.6%; these are quarterly rates, which correspond to two standard
deviations below and above the mean growth rate µg. Each frontier defines a default region,
and countries default for values of debt and endowments that are below the frontier: for a given
mean growth rate g (i.e., a particular frontier on this graph) and a given debt level, countries
tend to default when they experience bad endowment shocks z . The higher the debt levels, the
more likely the defaults. In other words, a country with little debt can sustain without defaulting
larger negative shocks than a highly indebted country. But default policies also depend on overall
economic conditions: in good times, when the mean growth rate is high, it takes a much larger
negative shock for a country to default than during adverse economies, when the mean growth
rate is low. Now that we have defined default sets, we turn to bond prices. We come back to
this figure in the next section to study the impact of the lenders’ risk-aversion.
Bond prices Q(B′, x) are a function of the current state vector x and the desired level of
borrowing B′. If borrowers do not default at date t + 1, lenders receive payoffs equal to the
face value of the bonds, which is normalized to 1. In case of default at date t + 1, payoffs are
zero.15 Starting from the investor’s Euler equation, the bond price function is:
Q(B′, x) = E[M ′11−dp(B′,x)] = E[M ′]E[11−dp(B′,x)] + cov [M ′, 11−dp(B′,x)], (3)
15This simplifying assumption can be relaxed: see Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2009) for an example of a
convex recovery rate.
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Figure 2: Default Policy Set
This figure plots the default policy set D(B) as a function of the beginning-of-period asset positions B and consumption shocks z
for different values of the mean endowment growth rate g and local risk-aversion of the lender. A low surplus-consumption ratio s is
equivalent to a high risk-aversion coefficient of the lender. The cross-country correlation in consumption growth shocks ρ is equal to
0.5. We consider two values of the mean endowment growth rates: −3.4% and 4.6%; these are quarterly rates, which correspond to
two standard deviations below and above the mean growth rate µg . We also consider two values for the log surplus-consumption ratio:
0.7% and 9.4%; these correspond to consumption levels that are respectively 0.7% and 9.4% above the habit (or subsistence) level.
For a given adverse endowment shock, countries are more likely to default when they are more indebted, when the mean growth rate
is low, and when lenders are more risk-averse.
where M ′ is the investors’ stochastic discount factor and is equal to:
M ′ = δ
Uc(C
′, H′)
Uc(C,H)
= δ(
S′C ′
SC
)−γ = δe−γ[g+(φ−1)(st−s)+(1+λ(st))(∆ct+1−g)].
A risk-free asset pays one unit of the consumption good in any state of nature and has a
price equal to Qr f = E[M ′]. If investors are risk-neutral, sovereign bond prices depend only on
expected default probabilities: Q(B′, x) = E[11−dp(B′,x)]×Qr f . Risk aversion introduces a new
component to sovereign bond pricing. For a given default probability, bond prices depend on the
covariance between investors’ stochastic discount factors and default events. If defaults tend
to occur in bad times for investors (i.e., when their marginal utility of consumption is high), the
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covariance term in Equation (3) is negative, bond prices are low, and yields are high. Likewise,
if defaults tend to occur in good times for investors, yields are low.
VI. Simulation
We simulate the model at a quarterly frequency. Parameters describing lenders’ consumption
growth and preferences (g, σ, γ, φ, δ, and r f ) are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
Parameters describing the borrowers’ endowments and constraints (αg, σg, µg, αz , σz , µz , β,
θ, and pi) are from Aguiar and Gopinath (2006, 2007). Given our interest in time-varying risk
premia, we cannot log-linearize the model, and we resort to a discrete dynamic programming
approach with four state variables. We use parallel computing (with 32 computers) to solve the
model. As our calibration and simulation method are otherwise standard, we leave them out in
the online appendix. To describe our results, we first focus on the impact of risk-aversion on
equilibrium debt characteristics in a given country and then turn to portfolios of countries, as
we did in the previous sections.
VI. A. Risk Aversion and Optimal Debt Price, Quantity, and Default
Risk-aversion implies a novel link between countries.
Optimal Default Default decisions depend on overall economic conditions, i.e., high or low
mean growth rates and endowment shocks. This is the first order effect. But a second mecha-
nism is also at play. In order to describe it, we first focus on low mean endowment growth rates
(the upper frontiers in Figure 2). The solid line corresponds to a low value of the investors’
log surplus consumption ratio (0.7%), i.e., a high curvature of the investor’s utility function,
akin to a very high coefficient of risk aversion. The dotted line corresponds to a high surplus
consumption ratio (9.4%) and low risk aversion. In other words, these two values correspond to
consumption levels that are respectively 0.7% and 9.4% above the habit (or subsistence) level.
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The novelty is that the borrower’s decision to default depends on the lenders’ risk aversion.
Graphically, the default frontier is higher when risk-aversion is high. What is the intuition for
this result? If lenders are very risk averse, both risk premia and interest rates are high. Each
period, borrowers decide to repay or default. Repaying past debt offers a foreign country the
option to borrow again. Since it is now very costly to borrow, this option is less attractive. As a
result, the emerging country tends to default even for mildly adverse shocks. On the contrary,
when lenders are not risk-averse, both risk premia and interest rates are low. It is less costly to
borrow and the emerging country can withstand larger adverse shocks without defaulting. The
same logic applies when mean growth rates are higher, as shown in the lower two frontiers. In
good times, defaults occur only when the country experiences a very negative temporary shock.
But again, the impact of this shock depends on the lenders’ risk aversion. A given shock might
trigger a default when investors are very risk-averse but not otherwise.
We obtain naturally the opposite results when the correlation between borrowers and lenders
business cycles is negative (ρ = −0.5). In this case, with high risk aversion, insurance premia
are high and interest rates are low (since bad times in the emerging country are typically good
times in the U.S.).
The model thus illustrates the link between lenders’ risk aversion and borrowers’ default
decisions. When business cycles are positively correlated, default sets are larger the higher the
lenders’ risk aversion. For a given negative shock in an emerging country, defaults become more
likely the higher the lenders’ risk aversion. In equilibrium, it looks as if very risk-averse lenders
push emerging countries towards default.
Equilibrium Bond Prices We turn now to bond prices. Default decisions depend on the
interaction between temporary and permanent shocks and on lenders’ risk aversion. These
variables naturally affect bond prices. Figure 3 plots those bond prices as a function of borrowing
levels (B′). The left panel focuses on the impact of the borrower’s economic conditions, for
a given low level of the lender’s risk-aversion. The right panel focuses on the impact of risk
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aversion, for a given low mean growth rate of the borrower’s endowment. We start with the left
panel.
For a given debt level, bond prices are higher and interest rates lower when the emerging
country experiences positive rather than negative temporary shocks. This first effect is large;
in Figure 3 it corresponds to the difference between the two lines with round markers (upper
part) and the two lines without markers (lower part). This effect is amplified by permanent
shocks. Bad shocks during low average growth periods imply lower prices and higher yields than
the same shocks during high average growth times. The impact of permanent shocks on bond
prices corresponds to the difference between the solid and dotted lines. Sovereign yields are high
in bad economic periods for the borrower because default probabilities are high. This would be
the case if investors were risk-neutral too.
Let us focus now on the right-hand side panel. We next compare the price of a bond with and
without the risk premium component (i.e., the covariance term in Equation 3). We consider an
emerging country with a business cycle that is positively related to the investors’ consumption
growth (the correlation coefficient ρ is equal to 0.5). In a first approximation, these bond
prices correspond to risk-neutral pricing.16 As we expect, the risk premium lowers bond prices
and increase yields: bonds issued by countries that tend to default more frequently when the
investors’ marginal utility is high are riskier and command higher yields. This cross-country
link would not exist with risk-neutral investors. It is sizable only when risk-aversion is high and
vanishes as risk aversion decreases.
In equilibrium, borrowers tend to default when they experience adverse economic shocks.
Investors know expected default probabilities and require higher risk premia from borrowers that
are more likely to default in bad times and whose default probabilities increase in bad times,
from the investors’ perspective.
16Note, however, that emerging countries dealing with risk-neutral investors would choose different debt quan-
tities. In this figure, in order to highlight the impact of risk aversion for a given indebtedness, we simply compute
artificial prices without the covariance term in Equation 3 but for the same debt dynamics.
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Figure 3: Bond Price Function
This figure present bond prices Q as a function of the amount of debt issued B. The cross-country correlation in endowment growth
shocks ρ is equal to 0.5. In the left panel, we focus on the impact of the borrowers’ economic conditions. Lines with circular markers
correspond to high values of the transitory component of endowment z . Lines without markers correspond to low values of z . In each
case, dotted lines correspond to high values of the permanent component of endowment growth g. In bad times, bond prices are low
and yields are high, particularly so during periods of low average growth. In the right panel, we focus on the impact of the lenders’ risk
aversion. Solid lines correspond to bond prices. Dotted lines correspond to bond prices without their risk premium components. Lines
with (without) markers correspond to high (low) values of z . Countries that tend to default more frequently in bad times for investors
pay higher yields than other countries.
Business Cycles We now turn to the model’s implications for real business cycle variables. We
focus on the annualized volatility of HP-filtered output, output growth, consumption, and trade
balance as a fraction of GDP, along with their first-order quarterly autocorrelation coefficients.
As its predecessors, the model broadly matches these moments.17
The model delivers large amounts of average debt in equilibrium. Average debt levels range
from around 27% of GDP for countries that are positively correlated to the U.S. to more than
17The volatility of HP-filtered output is 6.6% per year versus 5.4% on average in the data; its autocorrelation
is 0.78, close to its empirical value (0.81). Consumption is more volatile than output in the model as in the data
(1.6 times more volatile in the model and 1.3 times in the data). The trade balance is more volatile and less
countercyclical in the model than in the data: as a fraction of output, the simulated trade balance has a standard
deviation of 7.6% when shocks are uncorrelated between countries (the equivalent case to risk-neutrality). In the
data, the average standard deviation of the trade balance ratio is 5%. The correlation of the trade balance with
GDP is -0.13 in the model versus -0.3 in the data.
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30% for countries that are negatively correlated to the U.S. This order of magnitude is in line
with the amount of public external debt reported in Table 1. We compare the model to public
external debt levels because all bonds in the model are issued by the government and bought by
foreigners. Simulated maximum debt levels reach even higher values, up to 60%.
The model endogenously delivers default probabilities that range from 3% to 6%. Considering
the large uncertainty that surrounds default probabilities, this range appears consistent with the
data. We do not attempt to tweak the calibration in order to reach a target of 3% (which
is a simple order of magnitude, mostly linked to the three defaults in Argentina over the last
hundred years) or the 2% obtained in our short sample. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that
many countries (e.g., Indonesia, India, China, and the Phillipines) have spent more than 10% of
their independent life in default and that Africa’s record is much worse. Our model implies that
emerging countries spend between almost 7% and 14% of their time in default.
The model produces excess returns that increase with the business cycle correlation. As
expected, countries whose business cycles are positively (negatively) correlated with the U.S.
offer positive (negative) excess returns to U.S. investors. The difference in excess returns
across these two polar cases is 3.4%, thus sizable, but lower than in the data. The correlation
of excess returns and trade balances is close to zero in the simulations and to 0.1 on average in
the data. Likewise, the correlation of excess returns and output is on average equal to -0.1 in the
simulations; it is equal to -0.2 on average in the data. The model delivers yield spreads, defined
as differences between yields on foreign bonds and yields on U.S. bonds of similar maturities,
that are in line with the data.
VI. B. Building Portfolios of Simulated Data
We solve our model for a set of 36 countries and use the simulated data to build portfolios that
mimic the actual EMBI portfolios. We use stock market betas computed on rolling windows,
as we did with actual data. We obtain betas by regressing foreign bond realized excess returns
on a constant and simulated U.S. stock market excess returns. At the end of each period t, we
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thus sort all countries into six portfolios on the basis of market betas (βMkt). The portfolios
are re-balanced at the end of every period. For each portfolio j , we compute the excess returns
r e,jt+1 by taking the average of the excess returns in the portfolio. Excess returns correspond to
the returns in emerging countries minus the risk-free rate in the large, developed economy.
Unlike on actual EMBI portfolios, here we sort bonds along only one dimension. The reason is
simple: there is only one source of risk that is priced in the model: it is ultimately the correlation
between consumption growth shocks in the U.S. and bond returns. In order to interpret the
two-dimensional sort we used in the data, we would need to introduce a second source of
heterogeneity across countries. If countries differ in terms of their endowment volatility (and
the correlation is not zero), then expected default probabilities reflect risk premia: for a given
beta, higher endowment volatilities entail higher default probabilities and higher expected excess
returns. For example, if the volatility of temporary shocks (σz) doubles, the equilibrium default
probability is multiplied by four and the average excess return more than doubles. As a result,
introducing heterogeneity in endowment volatilities and sorting countries on default probabilities
and market betas would produce a double cross-section of excess returns, similar to the one we
obtain in the data by sorting on ratings. This two-dimensional cross-section would naturally be
priced by a unique risk factor. To keep the model transparent though, we introduce only one
key source of heterogeneity, the cross-country correlation of endowment shocks.
Table 3 provides an overview of the six portfolios. Panel A reports the average market beta
(βjMkt) for countries in portfolio j . Business cycles of countries with low βMkt are negatively
correlated with the investors’ consumption growth. These countries on average default more
frequently when investors’ consumption is high and above their habit levels. On the contrary,
countries with high βMkt default more frequently when investors’ consumption is low and close
to their habit levels. Panel B reports average expected default probabilities. Sorting on βMkt
implies a cross-section of average default probabilities, with a spread of 2 percentage points.
Note that high beta countries have lower default probabilities than low beta countries.
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Table 3: Portfolios of Simulated Data
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Stock Market Beta: βMkt (Pre-Formation)
Mean −0.25 −0.12 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.13
Std 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13
Panel B: Default Probability
Mean 5.85 5.41 4.89 4.50 4.17 3.84
Std 1.33 1.21 1.09 1.02 0.96 0.91
Panel C: Excess Return: r e
Mean −1.24 −0.66 −0.14 0.29 0.52 0.65
Std 21.06 19.73 18.64 17.88 17.28 16.68
Std* 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04
Panel D: Debt/Output
Mean 30.14 29.71 29.29 29.01 28.67 28.52
Std 7.09 6.92 6.78 6.73 6.73 6.67
Panel E: Stock Market Beta: βMkt (Post-Formation)
Mean −0.14 −0.08 −0.04 0.00 0.03 0.05
Std 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: This table reports, for each portfolio j , the average slope coefficient βMkt (pre-formation) from a regression of one-quarter
sovereign bonds’ excess returns on the investors’ stock market excess returns (Panel A), the average expected probability of default
(Panel B), the average excess return (Panel C), the debt to output ratio (Panel D) and the post-formation betas (Panel E). Post-
formation betas correspond to slope coefficients in regressions of quarterly portfolios’ excess returns on quarterly investor’s stock market
excess returns. Probabilities of default, excess returns and debt ratios are reported in percentage points. Excess returns and default
probabilities are annualized. For each variable, the table reports its mean and its standard deviation. For excess returns, the table also
reports standard deviations (denoted Std∗) in samples without defaults.
Cross-section of Simulated Excess Returns Panel C shows that the larger the market βjMkt ,
the higher the excess returns. Higher beta countries are riskier because their bonds prices are
lower during poor economic periods, and thus they should offer higher excess returns on average.
The model produces average excess returns that range from -1.2% to 0.7% per annum. In the
model, some countries are good hedges to U.S. consumption growth risk, and thus the negative
average excess returns. In the data, our portfolios deliver positive excess returns on average,
but they do not include transaction costs. Net excess returns on our first portfolios would likely
turn out to be negative. More importantly, the difference in excess returns between low and
high beta countries in the model is large and amounts to 190 basis points annually. Those
44
excess returns, however, are lower than in the data. Matching means and variances of sovereign
bond excess returns would certainly necessitate to look at longer maturities. Excess returns also
appear much more volatile than in the data. This volatility reflects our assumption that recovery
rates are zero in case of defaults. In samples without defaults, standard deviations are much
lower and close to 1%.
The sizable cross section of simulated sovereign bond returns may appear unsurprising in
light of our empirical results. Yet, its existence in a fully-specified model is not mechanical
because debt levels, default decisions, and risk premia are all endogenous. The model allows
for risk premia to exist but does not impose them. Countries facing high borrowing costs, for
example, might decrease their debt levels, thus reducing their default probabilities and their risk
premia to negligible levels. On the contrary, of course, the existence of sovereign risk premia in
a fully-specified model reinforces the credibility of our initial empirical findings.
Asset Pricing We run the same asset pricing experiment on simulated data. We use the
simulated U.S. stock market return as a risk factor and our six portfolios of simulated excess
returns. The cross-sectional R2 is equal to 95% and the market price of risk is positive and
significant. As in the data, the estimated market price of risk is higher than the average U.S.
simulated stock market return, but the spread is not as large. The model produces a cross-
section of portfolio excess returns, with smaller spreads in returns than in the data; betas are
also smaller. But we obtain a clear cross-section of portfolio betas, as reported in the last panel
of Table 3. The model also implies a time-varying market price of risk, justifying our conditional
asset pricing experiments. Overall, our model offers a natural interpretation of our empirical
facts.
Our model starts from endowments and implies strong links between endowment shocks in
emerging countries and their bond prices. Unfortunately, long and reliable macroeconomic time-
series for those markets are not available. Yet, the model is useful as it derives the equilibrium
domestic stock market returns and foreign bond returns such that we can connect to the financial
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data readily available for emerging markets. This macro-finance approach is helpful: it highlights
the impact of risk premia on macroeconomics quantities. The case of risk-neutral investors is
similar to the case of uncorrelated endowment shocks (or zero market betas); there, risk aversion
does not matter. In our model, the amount of debt and the default probabilities change across
countries, even if all borrowers face the same endowment volatilities. Their behaviors only differ
because their risk premia differ. We find that average optimal default probabilities can increase
or decrease by 1.5 percentage points around the risk-neutral benchmark. The average amount
of debt varies by 1.3 percentage points around the same benchmark. The volatilities of the
consumption growth or trade balances also vary. The impact of risk premia on macroeconomic
quantities in this model are quite large considering that all debt matures in one period. We
conjecture that the impact of risk premia would be even larger in a model with multi-period
debt.
“Peso” Explanation? The model is also useful to revisit the small sample issue, or “Peso”
problem: the high in-sample average excess returns on high market beta countries could simply
exist because we do not observe the large and negative returns from defaults waiting to happen,
not because investors are risk-averse. In order to rule out the“Peso” explanation, we replicate our
empirical work on long time series of simulated data from a model with risk neutral investors. We
randomly select, with replacement, 36 sub-samples with in-sample realized default probabilities
that are half of the long-run default probability. Those sub-samples correspond to the “Peso”
story: investors are risk-neutral but econometricians do not observe enough defaults. We build 6
portfolios by sorting countries on stock market betas, repeat the procedure 1000 times, and then
compute averages and standard deviations of the portfolios’ market betas, default probabilities
and excess returns. Results are presented in Table 4. As expected, small-sample portfolios
exhibit larger excess returns than their long-sample counterparts (because of the smaller number
of defaults). But there is no clear cross-section of average realized excess returns across the 6
portfolios in the small, low-default-probability sample. A model with risk neutral investors applied
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to samples that do not contain enough defaults yet does not produce the mapping between stock
market betas and average excess returns that we uncovered in our empirical work.
Table 4: Portfolios of Simulated Data: Risk-Neutral Investors and ”Peso” Explanation?
Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel I: Low-Default-Probability Sample
Stock market beta: βMkt
Mean −0.36 −0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.03 0.27
Std 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.15
Default probability
Mean 2.35 2.33 2.30 2.27 2.29 2.29
Std 6.67 6.61 6.57 6.52 6.56 5.47
Excess return: r e
Mean 2.44 2.47 2.51 2.53 2.50 2.50
Std 6.80 6.73 6.69 6.64 6.68 5.57
Panel II: Full Sample
Stock market beta: βMkt
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Std 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Default probability
Mean 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15
Std 22.54 22.54 22.54 22.54 22.54 22.54
Excess return: r e
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std 22.91 22.91 22.91 22.91 22.91 22.91
Notes: This table reports, for each portfolio j , the average slope coefficient βMkt (pre-formation) from a regression of one-quarter
sovereign bonds’ excess returns on the investors’ stock market excess returns, the average probability of default, and the average
excess return. Probabilities of default and excess returns are reported in percentage points. Excess returns and default probabilities are
annualized. For each variable, the table reports its mean and its standard deviation. For each country, we use simulated data from a
model with risk-neutral investors and realized default probabilities not larger than half their full sample values. More precisely, we start
from a long time series (120,000 quarters) of simulated data. We randomly select, with replacement, 36 sub-samples (1400 quarters)
with in-sample realized default probabilities not greater than half of the realized default probability of the longer sample. We build
6 portfolios by sorting countries on stock market betas, repeat this procedure 1000 times, and then compute averages and standard
deviations of the portfolios’ market betas, default probabilities and excess returns. The top panel of this table reports the properties of
the 6 portfolios built on samples with low probabilities of default and the bottom panel focuses on the whole sample.
Discrepancies We end this paper by highlighting the key discrepancies between the model and
the data. First, average excess returns and spreads in excess returns between high and low
default probability countries and between high and low beta countries are smaller than in the
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data. This discrepancy is likely due to the short maturity of simulated bonds: we only consider
one-period (i.e., three-month) bonds, whereas the average maturity is close to 10 years in the
data. Such a maturity difference matters: if their short sample is any guide, term structures
of CDS rates are strongly upward-sloping on average, with 10-year rates being on average five
times higher than short-term rates. As a result, we do not attempt to match actual returns with
our one-period bonds. The model could be extended in this direction: Hatchondo and Martinez
(2009) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2010) offer potential mechanisms to increase maturities
without adding state variables. Second, the model does not take into account interest rate risk.
Building macroeconomic models of the yield curve is still a challenge even for closed economies
without default risk. This challenge is particularly obvious for emerging economies because
their counter-cyclical real interest rates lead to downward sloping real yield curves in existing
macroeconomic models. We thus leave the extension to rich yield curve dynamics for future
research. Third, in the model, the cross-country correlation of endowment shocks is the sole
source of heterogeneity across countries. It is constant, while there is time variation in the bond
betas that we measure. This assumption appears to us as a natural first step. Adding volatility
in these correlations would not add much to the economics of the model, which already produces
some time-variation in betas because of the time-varying means of endowment growth rates and
time-varying risk aversion. Likewise, adding heterogeneity in the endowment volatilities would
offer a second source of cross-sectional variation in excess returns – and thus justify sorting
countries along two dimensions – but it would not change the mechanism of the model.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that emerging market betas impact sovereign bond prices and that risk
matters on these markets. In the data, countries with higher market betas pay higher borrowing
rates. The difference in returns between countries with high and low betas is large, as large
actually as the difference in returns between countries with low and high default probabilities.
The market price of sovereign risk appears consistent with the market price of corporate default
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risk. The leading structural models of sovereign debt assume that investors are risk-neutral and
thus cannot account for our empirical findings.
We provide a numerical illustration of a model with endogenous default and time-varying risk
premia. In the model, borrowing countries only differ along one dimension: their endowments
are more or less correlated to the lenders’ consumption. Lenders’ habit preferences lead to
differences in returns between countries, albeit smaller than in the data. The model illustrates
the impact of lenders’ time-varying risk aversion on borrowers’ default decisions.
Introducing risk-aversion offers a new perspective on puzzling facts about sovereign debt;
risk-aversion implies, for example, that there is no linear relation between interest rates and
debt levels, or between interest rates and output. An endogenously higher risk-aversion and
thus higher market prices of risk offers an interpretation to the large increase in yields in the fall
of 2008. Finally, the mechanism highlighted in this paper implies that currency unions might
lead to higher borrowing costs since they imply higher business cycles’ synchronization, and thus
higher sovereign risk premia.
Our empirical methodology and our general equilibrium model are relevant to address default
risk premia in other contexts. The literature on consumer bankruptcy faces endogenous deci-
sions to default that are similar to the ones described in this paper. Notable examples include
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).
Likewise, firm dynamics depend on financial market features and endogenous defaults, as shown
in Cooley and Quadrini (2001). These papers, however, consider only risk-neutral financial in-
termediaries. Our work shows that lenders’ risk aversion affect both optimal debt quantities and
prices.
49
References
Acharya, Viral V., Itamar Drechsler, and Philipp Schnabl, “A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts
and Sovereign Credit Risk,” 2011. Working Paper.
Adler, Michael and Rong Qi, “Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign Defaults,” Emerging Mar-
kets Review, 2003, 4, 91–120.
Aguiar, Mark and Gita Gopinath, “Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account,”
Journal of International Economics, 2006, 69, 64–83.
and , “Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend,” Journal of Political
Economy, 2007, 115 (1), 69–101.
Almeida, Heitor and Thomas Philippon, “The Risk-Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress,”
Journal of Finance, 2007, 62 (6), 2557 – 2586.
Alvarez, Fernando E. and Urban J. Jermann, “Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with
Risk of Default,” Econometrica, 2000, 68 (4), 775–798.
Amador, Manuel, “Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons,” 2008. Working Paper,
Stanford University.
Andrade, Sandro C., “A Model of Asset Pricing under Country Risk,” Journal of International
Money and Finance, 2009, 28 (4), 671–695.
and Vidhi Chhaochharia, “How costly is sovereign default? Evidence from financial
markets,” 2011. Working Paper.
Andrews, Donald W.K., “Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimation,” Econometrica, 1991, 59 (1), 817–858.
Ang, Andrew and Francis Longstaff, “Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk: Lessons from the U.S.
and Europe,” 2011. Working Paper.
Arellano, Cristina, “Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies,” American
Economic Review, 2008, 98 (3), 690–712.
and Ananth Ramanarayanan, “Default and the Term Structure in Sovereign Bonds,”
2009. Working Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Atkeson, Andrew, “International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation,” Econo-
metrica, July 1991, 59 (4), 1069–1089.
50
Bansal, Ravi and Amir Yaron, “Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset
Pricing Puzzles,” Journal of Finance, August 2004, 59, 1481–1509.
Barro, Robert, “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 2006, 121, 823–866.
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey, and Christian Lundblad, “Liquidity and Expected
Returns: Lessons from Emerging Markets,” Review of Financial Studies, 2007, 20 (6),
1783–1832.
Benjamin, David and Mark L. J. Wright, “Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays
in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations,” 2009. Working paper UCLA.
Bhamra, Harjoat S., Lars-Alexander Kuehn, and Ilya A. Strebulaev, “The Levered Equity
Risk Premium and Credit Spreads: A Unified Framework,” Review of Financial Studies,
2010, 23, 546–703.
Boehmer, Ekkehart and William L. Megginson, “Determinants of Secondary Market Prices
for Developing Country Syndicated Loans,” Journal of Finance, 1990, 45 (5), 1517–1540.
Bolton, Patrick and Olivier Jeanne, “Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The
Role of a Bankruptcy Regime,” Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 115 (6), 901–924.
Broner, Fernando A., Guido Lorenzoni, and Sergio L. Schmukler, “Why Do Emerging
Economies Borrow Short Term,” Journal of the European Economic Association, forth-
coming, 2011.
Broner, Fernando, Alberto Martin, and Jaume Ventura, “Sovereign Risk and Secondary
Markets,” American Economic Review, 2010, 100, 1523–1555.
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff, “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?,” American
Economic Review, 1989, 79 (1), 43–50.
Campbell, John Y. and John H. Cochrane, “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based
Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, April
1999, 107 (2), 205–251.
Cavanagh, John and Richard Long, “Methodology Brief: Introducing the J.P. Morgan Emerg-
ing Markets Bond Index Global,” 1999. J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Research.
51
Chatterjee, S., D. Corbae, M. Nakajima, and J. Rios-Rull, “A Quantitative Theory of
Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default,” Econometrica, 2007, 75 (6), 1525 –
1589.
Chatterjee, Satyajit and Burcu Eyigungor, “Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk,” April
2010. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper.
Chen, Long, Pierre Colin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein, “On the Relation Between
Credit Spread Puzzles and the Equity Premium Puzzle,” Review of Financial Studies, 2008,
22 (9), 3367–3409.
Chien, YiLi and Hanno Lustig, “The Market Price of Aggregate Risk and the Wealth Distri-
bution,” Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23, 1596–1650.
Cochrane, John H., Asset Pricing, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Cole, Harold L. and Timothy J. Kehoe, “Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises,” Review of Economic
Studies, 2000, 67, 91–216.
Cooley, Thomas F. and Vincenzo Quadrini, “Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 2001, 91 (5), 1286–1310.
Coval, Joshua, Jakub W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford, “Economic Catastrophe Bonds,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 2009, 99, 628–666.
Duffie, Darrell, Lasse H. Pedersen, and Kenneth J. Singleton, “Modeling Sovereign Yield
Spreads: A Case Study of Russian Debt,” Journal of Finance, 2003, 83 (1), 119–159.
Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz, “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and
Empirical Analys,” Review of Economic Studies, April 1981, 48 (2), 289–309.
Edwards, Sebastian, “LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical Investigation,
1976-80,” American Economic Review, 1984, 74 (4), 726–734.
Fama, Eugene and James MacBeth, “Risk and Return in Equilibrium: Empirical Tests,”
Journal of Political Economy, 1973, 81, 3–56.
Favero, Carlo, Marco Pagano, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, “How Does Liquidity Affect
Bond Yields?,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010, 45 (1), 107–134.
Fostel, Ana and John Geanakoplos, “Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy,” American
Economic Review, 2008, 98 (4), 1211–1244.
52
Gabaix, Xavier, “Variable Rare Disasters: An Exactly Solved Framework for Ten Puzzles in
Macro Finance,” November 2008. Working Paper NYU Stern.
Garleanu, Nicolae and Stavros Panageas, “Young, Old, Conservative, and Bold: The Impli-
cations of Heterogeneity and Finite Lives for Asset Pricing,” April 2008. Working paper
UC Berkeley.
Giesecke, Kay, Francis A. Longstaff, Stephen Schaefer, and Ilya Strebulaev, “Corporate
Bond Default Risk: A 150-Year Perspective,” Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming,
2011.
Gilchrist, Simon, Vladimir Yankov, and Egon Zakrajsek, “Credit Supply Shocks: Evidence
from Corporate Bond and Stock Markets,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2009, 56 (4),
471–493.
Hansen, Lars Peter, “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,”
Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1029–54.
Hatchondo, Juan Carlos and Leonardo Martinez, “Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign De-
faults,” Journal of International Economics, 2009, 79, 117–125.
Hilscher, Jens and Yves Nosbusch, “Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fun-
damentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt,” Review of Finance, 2010, 14, 235 – 262.
Kehoe, Timothy J. and David K. Levine, “Debt-Constrained Asset Markets,” Review of
Economic Studies, 1993, 60, 868–888.
Lettau, Martin and Sydney Ludvigson, “Measuring and Modeling Variation in the Risk-Return
Tradeoff,” in Yacine Ait-Sahalia and Lars Peter Hansen, eds., Handbook of Financial Econo-
metrics, Elsevier, 2009.
Livshits, Igor, James MacGee, and Michele Tertilt, “Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start,”
American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (1), 402 – 418.
Lizarazo, Sandra Valentina, “Default Risk and Risk Averse International Investors,” 2010.
Working paper ITAM.
Longstaff, Francis A., Jun Pan, Lasse H. Pedersen, and Kenneth J. Singleton, “How
Sovereign is Sovereign Credit Risk?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2011,
43 (2), 75–103.
53
Lustig, Hanno and Adrien Verdelhan, “Business Cycle Variation in the Risk-Return Tradeoff,”
2010. Working Paper.
Martin, Ian, “Consumption-Based Asset Pricing with Higher Cumulants,” 2008. Working Paper
Stanford University.
Mehra, R. and E. Prescott, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
1985, 15, 145–161.
Mendoza, Enrique G. and Vivian Z. Yue, “A Solution to the Default Risk Business Cycle
Disconnect,” June 2008. NBER Working Paper 13861.
Neumeyer, Pablo and Fabrizio Perri, “Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of
Interest Rates,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2005, 52 (2), 345–380.
Newey, Whitney K. and Kenneth D. West, “A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedas-
ticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,” Econometrica, 1987, 55 (3),
703–708.
Pan, Jun and Kenneth J. Singleton, “Default and Recovery Implicit in the Term Structure of
Sovereign CDS Spreads,” Journal of Finance, October 2008, 5, 2345–2384.
Patton, Andrew J. and Allan Timmermann, “Monotonicity in Asset Returns: New Tests with
Applications to the Term Structure, the CAPM and Portfolio Sorts,” Journal of Financial
Economics, forthcoming, 2010.
Philippon, Thomas, “The Bond Market’s Q,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, 124(3),
1011–56.
Pouzo, Demian, “Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default Under Incomplete Markets,”
2009. Working Paper, Berkeley University.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth Rogoff, This time is different: eight centuries of financial
folly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Remolona, Eli M, Michela Scatigna, and Eliza Wu, “The Dynamic Pricing of Sovereign Risk
in Emerging Markets,” Journal of Fixed Income, 2008, 17 (4), 57–71.
Rietz, Thomas A., “The Equity Risk Premium: A Solution?,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
1988, 22 (1), 117–131.
54
Ross, Stephen A., “The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 1976, 13, 341–360.
Shanken, Jay, “On the Estimation of Beta-Pricing Models,” The Review of Financial Studies,
1992, 5 (2), 1–33.
Tomz, Micheal, Reputation and International Cooperation, Sovereign Debt across Three Cen-
turies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Uribe, Martin and Vivian Yue, “Country Spreads and Emerging Markets: Who Drives
Whom?,” Journal of International Economics, June 2006, 69, 6–36.
Verdelhan, Adrien, “A Habit-Based Explanation of the Exchange Rate Risk Premium,” Journal
of Finance, 2010, 65 (1), 123–145.
Wachter, Jessica, “A Consumption-Based Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 79, 365–399.
Weil, Philippe, “The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 1989, 24, 401–424.
Yue, Vivian Z., “Sovereign Default and Debt Renegotiation,” Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 2010, 80 (2), 176–187.
Zame, William R., “Efficiency and the Role of Default when Security Markets are Incomplete,”
American Economic Review, 1993, 83 (5), 1142–1164.
55
